Sovereignty Is a Project! Strategic Autonomy, Germany’s Debate, and the Future of the West

Calls for the removal of American military bases from Europe periodically surface in political debate. They are usually framed as expressions of national self-assertion and as steps toward strategic sovereignty. The argument resonates with a broader sentiment that has gained traction in many Western societies: that Europe, nearly eighty years after the end of the Second World War, has yet to become a fully autonomous geopolitical actor.

This debate is particularly visible in Germany.

For decades, Germany has been one of the central pillars of the American security architecture in Europe. Major logistical hubs, command structures, and strategic infrastructure are located on German territory. As a result, discussions about sovereignty and alliance structures inevitably take on a special intensity in the German case.

What is noteworthy today is that this debate no longer comes exclusively from one political camp.

Elements of the German political left have long advocated a reduction—or even an end—to American military presence in Europe, often framing the issue in terms of pacifism or anti-militarism. More recently, however, similar questions have begun to appear within parts of the emerging European right as well. There, the argument is usually formulated in terms of sovereignty, national interest, and geopolitical autonomy.

Despite their ideological differences, both camps sometimes converge on a similar conclusion: that the presence of American military infrastructure on European soil is incompatible with full sovereignty.

The diagnosis of dependency touches on a real issue. Yet the conclusions often overlook a crucial strategic reality.

Sovereignty does not arise from declarations. It arises from capabilities.

A political community becomes sovereign when it can guarantee its own security, economic stability, and strategic agency. Not when it simply declares the intention to do so. And here lies the decisive point: Europe—including Germany—currently possesses these capabilities only partially.

American military infrastructure in Europe, particularly in Germany, is not merely a leftover of the postwar settlement. It forms part of a complex strategic architecture: airlift hubs, command centers, logistics networks, intelligence coordination, and medical infrastructure. For decades, this architecture has been an integral component of the deterrence structure that underpins European security.

Removing it abruptly would not produce sovereignty. It would first produce a vacuum. For that reason, the discussion about sovereignty must move beyond symbolic gestures toward structural realities. Political movements in opposition tend to formulate maximalist demands. Statesmanship, by contrast, requires the organization of power. Sovereignty is therefore not a declaration. It is a project.

The American Perspective: Stronger Allies, Not Weaker Ones

What is often overlooked in European discussions is that the call for greater European responsibility does not originate solely in Europe. It increasingly comes from the United States itself.

In recent years, a growing strategic consensus has emerged in Washington that Europe must assume a larger share of responsibility for its own defense and for the stability of the Western alliance.

During the Munich Security Conference 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio expressed this relationship in civilizational terms: “The United States is a child of Europe. Our histories are intertwined, and our futures will remain linked.”

This formulation emphasizes that the transatlantic relationship is not merely transactional. It rests on a shared historical and civilizational foundation. But precisely because of that foundation, American policymakers increasingly expect Europe to develop greater capabilities.

Rubio summarized the strategic logic of a functioning alliance succinctly: “Strong alliances require strong partners.”

The United States does not ultimately benefit from a permanently dependent Europe. What American strategists increasingly envision is a Europe capable of contributing militarily, technologically, and economically to the collective strength of the West. Rubio framed this ambition in historical terms: “Together we should work to build a new Western century.”

The objective, therefore, is not American dominance but a renewed Western partnership composed of multiple capable centers of power.

Europe Must Grow into Strategic Adulthood

This expectation becomes even clearer within the broader strategic debate about the future of American foreign policy. At the Munich Security Conference 2025, Vice President J. D. Vance addressed the issue with unusual directness: “The United States cannot and should not be the permanent security guarantor for a Europe that has the economic capacity to defend itself.”

In other words, the present imbalance within the alliance cannot remain permanent. But this expectation should not be misinterpreted as hostility toward Europe. Vance continued: “A strong and self-confident Europe is not a threat to America. It is exactly what a healthy alliance requires.”

These remarks point toward a strategic shift in the transatlantic relationship. The question is no longer whether Europe should remain dependent. The question is whether Europe—and particularly Germany as its largest economy—is prepared to assume a greater share of responsibility.

A Europe capable of defending itself, sustaining technological leadership, and contributing meaningfully to Western security would not weaken the alliance. It would stabilize it.

Germany at the Center of the Question

In many ways, Germany sits at the center of this debate. Because of its economic weight, industrial base, and geographic position, Germany would inevitably play a decisive role in any effort to develop genuine European strategic capabilities.

Yet Germany has long existed within a security framework that discouraged the development of autonomous military power. The postwar order combined economic strength with strategic restraint. Today, however, the geopolitical environment has changed. Questions of defense capability, technological sovereignty, and economic resilience have returned to the center of political debate.

In this context, discussions about sovereignty—whether emerging from the political left or from elements of the new European right—reflect a broader search for a new strategic equilibrium. But this equilibrium cannot be achieved through symbolic acts. It can only be achieved through the gradual construction of capabilities.

Europe would need to develop capacities that remain incomplete today: integrated command structures, a revitalized defense industrial base, strategic airlift capabilities, satellite intelligence systems, advanced missile defense, and technological leadership in key sectors. Only when such capabilities exist does the question of strategic autonomy become meaningful. Until then, sovereignty remains an aspiration rather than a reality.

A Final Reflection

This insight is hardly new. The German political thinker Carl Schmitt once formulated a principle that continues to resonate in contemporary geopolitical debates: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.”

Schmitt’s point was not merely legal. It was political. Sovereignty ultimately rests on the capacity to act decisively in moments of crisis. Sovereignty is therefore not defined by constitutional language or political rhetoric. It is defined by capability.

Applied to today’s geopolitical situation, the implication is straightforward. Strategic autonomy cannot be declared into existence. It must be built.

And building it does not require a rupture within the West. On the contrary, it may well be the condition for the long-term stability of the Western alliance. A more capable Europe—including a Germany willing to assume strategic responsibility—would not weaken transatlantic relations. It would transform them. From a relationship of dependence into one of partnership.

Or, put simply: Sovereignty does not begin with the removal of foreign troops. It begins with the ability to assume their role.

[based upon my article for Freilich-Magazine: https://www.freilich-magazin.com/politik/der-wunsch-nach-abkopplung-ueber-den-souveraenitaets-reflex-und-die-strategische-realitaet-des-westens